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1. Introduction 
 
In September 2011, the European Commission (2011) has evaluated options regarding 
the introduction of a harmonized Financial Sector Taxation framework. Among these 
options, the European Commission considered a Financial Activities Tax (FAT). 
Originally proposed by the IMF (2010), the FAT is, in its simplest form, a tax on the sum 
of profit and remunerations of the financial sector.  This tax has the features of being a 
good substitute for the VAT on the sector (as this later is exempted) and to present little 
distortions to the extent that it taxes rents of the sector. Three versions of the FAT can 
be considered. The first version, FAT1, defines the profit of financial institutions in cash-
flow terms and adds the remunerations paid by the sector. FAT2 takes the same base for 
profit but only adds 'excessive' remunerations, i.e. those above a defined threshold. 
Finally, FAT3 takes as tax base the sum of cash-flow profit above a defined return on 
capital and 'excessive' remunerations. 
At the same time, the banking sector is subject to various other regulatory proposals, 
aimed at strengthening the stability of the banking sector. In particular, the European 
Commission has put forward new rules for banks’ capital requirements, transposing into 
EU legislation the recent Basel III Accord, and is going to present a novel framework for 
crisis management. The latter, among other things, foresees the implementation of 
Resolution Funds (RF) whose function is that of limiting contagion effects across banks 
and thus of ensuring that bank failures can not take place in an uncontrolled fashion that 
would destabilise the financial system. 
In this context, it is important to investigate the contribution of banks to systemic risk 
and to see whether a Financial Activity Tax would be a good proxy for a fee that would 
mirror the individual contributions of banks to systemic risk. To this aim, the present 
contribution consists of an analysis, based on the banking system micro-simulation 
model SYMBOL , estimating the probability and magnitude of systemic losses deriving 
from banks' defaults, explicitly taking into account the effects of Basel capital 
requirements, Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and bank Resolution Funds (RF).  
SYMBOL also provides results for the contribution of individual banks to the risk of the 
banking sector as a whole, both in the case where contagion effects are controlled fully 
by DGS/RF (and the associated crisis management tools) and in the case when these 
tools are not completely effective in managing the effects of banking defaults. The 
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analysis has been developed for 19 EU Member States  using 2009 unconsolidated 
financial data for a sample of banks coming from Bankscope and augmented by further 
analysis by the European Commission's services, as well as integrations from 
Supervisory Authorities and/or Central Banks for some countries.  Moreover, some ECB 
data have been used to complete or correct the dataset.  
The remaining of this document develops as it follows. Section 2 introduces the SYMBOL 
model. Section 3 lists the main proposals on financial regulation incorporated in the 
SYMBOL analysis. Section 4 shows how SYMBOL has been used to obtain estimates of 
the banks’ individual contributions to systemic expected losses. Section 5 contains some 
summary statistics of the results, examples for selected countries and information on 
how to read detailed results file.. 
 
 
2. The SYMBOL model 
 
The SYMBOL model simulates individual bank credit losses for all banks in a banking 
system via a Monte Carlo simulation according to the Basel Foundation Internal Ratings 
Based (FIRB) function loss distribution and a correlation matrix. The loss distribution of 
each bank is calibrated to the credit risk implied by its regulatory capital requirement. 
The model can also simulate contagion via the interbank market, in order to capture 
systemic linkages between banks besides the fact that their assets are correlated. 
Simulations are based on the following three steps: 
(1) The average assets probability to default (PD) of each bank i ˆ iPD  is estimated. 
ˆ
iPD  is obtained as the PD that allows the actual value of the capital requirement for that 
specific bank Ki (extracted from balance-sheet data) to be equal to its numerically 
calculated value obtained from the Basel FIRB formula, setting the other variables, i.e. 
loss given default (LGD), maturity (M) and size (S), to their standard values: 
( )ˆ ˆ: | 0.45 2.5 50i i iPD K PD LGD M S K= = = =  
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where ( ) ( ), , , , , , 1,...,i ik ik ik ik ki ki ki ki ki ki
i
K PD LGD M S C PD LGD M S A k K= × =∑  
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(2) The calibrated ˆ iPD  are then used to generate a set of correlated losses across all banks 
in the system. For each simulation j, calculate bank i’s losses ijL  performing a Monte Carlo 
simulation based on the following representation of the FIRB formula: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1
1
ˆ , 501ˆ ˆ ˆ, 0.45 0.45
ˆ ˆ1 , 50 1 , 50
ˆ1 1.5 1.06
i
ij ij i i ij i
i i
i
R PD
L z PD N N PD N z PD
R PD R PD
B PD
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
= + − ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
− ×
 
Where 
1,...,i H= banks 
1,...,j J=  simulations 
( )~ 0,1 ,ijz N i j∀  
( )cov , 0.5ij ljz z i l= ∀ ≠  (where i, l are bank indexes) 
                                                        
1 see De Lisa et al., (2010) for a detailed explanation of all terms in this representation of the FIRB 
approach 
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(3) Simulated losses of banks are then compared with their capital: whenever the 
losses of a bank exceed its capital, the bank is considered to default: 
( )ˆ,ij ij i iL z PD CAP≥    
These ‘excess losses’ ( )ˆ,ij ij i iL z PD CAP−  are recorded (when at least one bank defaults) as 
‘no contagion losses’. The simulation is stopped once at least 100,000 runs with at least 
one simulated default is obtained. 
This produces a wealth of synthetic market scenarios, distributed as implicitly defined 
by the Basel II Regulation, correlated between banks, and based on proxies of assets PD 
and actual values of the total capital of each bank considered. This is the starting point 
for testing contagion effects. 
(4) To simulate contagion effects2 in the absence of an effective intervention by 
resolution facilities,3 exposures via the interbank market are used. Following James 
(1991), whenever a bank defaults, it is assumed that 40% of the amounts of its 
interbank debits are passed as losses to creditor banks and distributed among them. 
Losses are distributed following a criterion of proportionality: the portion of loss 
absorbed by each ‘infected’ bank is proportional to its creditor exposure in the interbank 
market. 4 Whenever, with this additional loss the simulation shows that another bank's 
losses exceed its capital, that banks is also considered to default, and so on bank after 
bank until no additional bank defaults. 
 Therefore losses for each bank i in each j run become: 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ, , ,cij ij i ij ij i l il
l
L z PD IB L z PD D x= +∑  where l ≠ I, 1lD =  if bank l defaulted, and zero 
otherwise and IB is the matrix of interbank exposures with elements xil  
                                                        
2  Only domestic contagion is included in the current version of SYMBOL. 
3 In the “best case” scenario, a resolution fund operating in coordination with a liquidity facility is 
assumed to be able to neutralize contagion by absorbing a share of excess losses proportional to the size 
of a banks’ interbank liabilities, while resolution and liquidity facilities are able to completely eliminate 
additional losses due to liquidation costs, fire sale effects and market congestion. 
4 It is worth noting that contagion effects are sensitive to the two assumptions made: the 40% of 
interbank debits that are passed as losses to creditor banks in case of failure, and the criterion of 
proportionality used to distribute these losses across banks. A loss of 40% on the interbank exposure is 
coherent with the upper bound of economic research on this issue. See James (1991), Mistrulli (2007), 
Upper and Worms (2004). The use of a matrix of exposures proportional to interbank credits is 
dependent on the fact that a bank-to-bank interbank lending matrix is not yet available to the 
Commission; however sensitivity analysis conducted by the authors on this aspect points to the fact that 
the exact shape of the matrix is less important than total size of interbank market. 
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Considering this, bank i defaults when ( )ˆ, ,cij ij i iL z PD IB CAP≥  and contagion is looped up to 
the cycle where no more banks default. 
Finally, net losses ( )ˆ, ,cnj nj j jL z PD IB CAP−  are recorded (when at least one bank defaults). 
Given that “contagion” results are based on the same starting seed in a random number 
generator and on the same simulation runs assures that differences in contagion results 
are only due to the effects of contagion. 
Losses can then be aggregated over the entire population of banks to derive systemic 
losses, which are computed as the sum of the losses in excess of capital over the entire 
sample of banks for both the “no contagion” and “contagion” cases. Therefore, for the j-
th simulation run, the systemic loss is the sum of individual banks’ excess losses: 
∑
=
=
H
i
Syst jiLjL
1
),()( . 
As in the current analysis we rely on a sample of banks (see annex A.1), distributions for 
the population of all banks in each Member State are finally obtained by rescaling the 
distributions proportionally according to the ratio of total assets in the sample and in 
the total banking sector in the MS. 
Finally, ordering the runs allows us to draw a probability distribution of aggregate 
losses, while keeping a memory of exactly which banks participated in generating losses 
simulated in each run.  
 
Calculating systemic risk contributions using SYMBOL 
Our methodology for calculating systemi risk contributions of every institution is a 
variation of the one proposed by Praschnik and Principato (2001) and is such that 
expected yearly losses are directly proportional to total losses simulated for each bank 
in all simulation runs. 
The contribution of bank i to systemic losses is defined as the expected yearly loss for 
this bank and is estimated as its average loss over the whole set of simulations, as it 
follows: 
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Next, the percentage contribution of each individual bank to the systemic risk is thus: 
∑
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It is also possible to focus the attention on the tail of the loss distribution and determine 
the contribution of each bank in causing losses higher than a certain threshold T (i.e. the 
contribution of a bank in determining systemic losses above the threshold T):5 
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3. Financial regulatory proposals incorporated in the analysis 
 
The European Commission is currently presenting three distinct proposals on financial 
regulation. First, the European commission considers a Capital Requirements Directive 
proposal (CRD IV), aimed at adopting the new rules proposed in the Basel 3 accord, 
including new definitions of capital for regulatory purposes, a new set of capital 
requirements for tier1 and total capital as a proportion of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) 
and the introduction of a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% of RWA. Second, on 12 July 
2010, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a thorough revision of the 
Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes. It mainly deals with a harmonisation and 
simplification of protected deposits, a faster payout, and an improved financing of 
schemes, as well as a substantial enlargement of the coverage (up to EUR 100,000), as a 
consequence of their funding. Third, it considers a Directive proposal for an EU crisis 
                                                        
5 The contribution of a bank to aggregate losses below the threshold T can also be obtained considering 
the difference between average yearly contributions on the whole set of simulations and on the runs 
with losses above the threshold. 
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management and banks resolution framework, including the creation of Resolution 
Funds in all MS.6 
The main features of these three proposals have been incorporated in the SYMBOL 
analysis, in order to come up with figures based on the most possible comprehensive 
view of all changes, which are expected to impact the banking sector in the near future. 
To take into account the effects of the new Basel 3 rules on capital requirements, 
distributions of losses are generated under the hypothesis that banks hold a capital 
equal at least to 8% or 10.5% of their Risk Weighted Assets (i.e. excluding or including 
the presence of a mandatory capital conservation buffer).7 In addition, a sensitivity 
analysis for alternative levels of capital requirements is presented. As far as Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes and Resolution Funds are concerned, instead, we base our working 
hypotheses on most recent version of these two proposals. In particular, the considered 
amount of funds available to DGS+RF purposes is the maximum between 1.5% of a 
country covered deposits and 0.3% of the amount of liabilities. Amounts of funds to be 
collected by the considered Member State are reported in last column of Table A.1. in the 
annex. 8 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
As a micro-simulation tool, SYMBOL can be used to simulate losses based on alternative 
settings attempting to capture the effects due to the implementation of regulatory 
propsals illustrated in previous section. These are represented via “regulatory settings” 
and “contagion situations”. Combinations of “settings” and “situations” identify the 
following “scenarios”, representing joint assumptions on the regulatory set-up and the 
                                                        
6  See e.g. the Communication on Bank Resolution Funds COM(2010)254 
                http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm#funds  
7 Regarding Basel III, SYMBOL takes account at the moment of the consequences due to changes in the 
definition of capital and of Risk Weighted Assets in the trading book, securitization and counterparty 
risk, as well as the introduction of the capital conservation buffer. The leverage ratio and the new 
measures on liquidity can be possibly factored into the methodology used on the basis of how they 
modify contagion between banks via the interbank market. The analysis does for the moment also not 
include the effect of the stricter Tier1 constraints imposed by Basel III. 
8 Figures in the last column of table A.1 refers to the sample of banks considered. As rules on the 
determination of the total amounts of funds available to DGS and RF in each MS are still under 
negotiation in the Council and the European Parliament, any rule adopted in the present study for 
simulation purposes can not reflect the final form of the rule as it will eventually be implemented. It 
was therefore chosen to calibrate funds available to DGS/RF on the basis of SYMBOL. In particular, 
preliminary SYMBOL results allows concluding that a calibration as the one considered would be 
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development of a financial crisis. In the current analysis SYMBOL is run based on two 
alternative regulatory settings and two alternative contagion situations9: 
The first setting regards the level of regulatory capital expressed as the minimum ratio 
of Capital to Risk Weighted Assets. Two different capital requirement settings are 
considered in order to evaluate the effects of the introduction or not of a mandatory 
“capital conservation buffer” for banks in Basel 3. In other words we distinguish 
between the situation where banks must hold a minimum capital equal to 8% of their 
Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) and the situation where a minimum capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5% is also put on top, so to reach at least a capital equal to 10.5% of RWA. 
The section on Sensitivity analysis will include additional requirement levels.  
Next, the second setting regards the contagion situations. They represent polar extremes 
of the effectiveness of interventions during the crisis.  In the “best” situation, funds and 
facilities are assumed to be able to work in such a way that no additional losses due to 
liquidity or “fire sale” effects are generated, so that only economic losses due to defaults 
in bank’s portfolios need to be covered, i.e. contagion effects are not considered. In 
contrast, the “worst” situation funds and facilities intervene, but they are not able to 
avoid liquidity and “fire sale” additional losses and to completely stop contagion. In sum, 
two situations are considered: one where intervention is perfectly effective in blocking 
contagion, and one where interventions are only able to reimburse losses but are not 
able to prevent contagion. As mentioned above, the first scenario assumes that 40% of 
the losses are passed to creditors.  
The combination of these hypothesis yields four possible “scenarios”, represented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Scenario definition 
Capital Setting Situations 
Scenario 
No 
Conservatio
n Buffer, i.e. 
capital ≥ 8% 
Conservatio
n Buffer, i.e. 
capital ≥ 
10.5% RWA 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
                                                                                                                                                                             
effective and efficient, as it would ensure public finances to be hit in less than 0.05% of the cases. 
9  On top of this, SYMBOL is also able to include the possibility of a “no bail-in” or a “bail-in” 
framework when DGS/RF absorbs losses. In the first case DGS/RF funds cover all non-equity creditors 
by absorbing losses of defaulted banks until funds are available; in the second case DGS/RF cover only 
insured depositors and inter-bank depositors (to avoid contagion), i.e. part of the losses would be 
absorbed by bondholders and depositors not eligible for insurance coverage. This distinction goes 
beyond the scope of this paper and is not considered here. 
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RWA 
1 X  X  
2 X   X 
3  X X  
4  X  X 
 
Scenario 1 represents the worst (most risky) scenario: banks hold at least a capital of 
8% of RWA and DGS/RF are ineffective in blocking contagion. Scenario 2 is the 
alternative for which, while the minimum capital stays at 8% of RWA, DGS/RF are 
effective in blocking contagion (no contagion). Next, in Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 banks 
hold at least a capital of equal to 10.5% of RWA but they differ in that DGS/RF are 
ineffective in blocking contagion, in Scenario 3 while it is in Scenario 4.  
For each of the scenarios, SYMBOL simulates excess losses for each individual bank in 
the sample. The sum of all of these losses is then used to generate the distribution of 
losses in each scenario. SYMBOL is further used to estimate the contribution of each 
bank to systemic losses. The individual bank's contribution is defined as the expected 
average yearly loss of this bank (over the whole set of SYMBOL simulations)10. A 
percentage contribution of each bank to the systemic risk is then obtained as the ratio of 
its individual contribution on the sum of individual contributions of all banks in each 
country.  
 
5. Results 
 
The following results are based on a total number of SYMBOL simulations so to obtain 
for each country 100,000 runs where at least one bank defaults. This high number of run 
is needed in order to guarantee that in the right tail of the distribution a sufficient 
number of points is sampled. 
 
                                                        
10 Contributions are calculated by excluding the more extreme events above the 99.999th quantile, in order 
to exclude the influence of events in the leftmost tail which could be suffering excess variance due to 
undersampling. 
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5.1 Distribution of excess losses 
Tables 4-7 show some selected percentiles of the distribution of systemic losses under 
the various scenarios for all considered MS. Distributions presented in these tables refer 
to the bank populations and are therefore comparable across MS. The tables report the 
cumulative distribution function of systemic excess losses. For instance for Scenario 1 in 
Belgium we can read that systemic excess losses are below 69,445 m€ in 99.9% of the 
cases. 
It is clear that losses decrease moving from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2, and from Scenario 
3 to Scenario 4, depending on the fact that contagion between banks is considered 
(Scenario 1 and 3) or not (Scenario 2 and 4). Moreover losses decrease when moving 
from a minimum capital ratio of 8% (Scenario 1 and 2) to a minimum capital ratio of 
10.5% (Scenario 3 and 4). 
 15
Table (4): Estimated distributions of systemic excess losses in Scenario 1- Million Euro (Capital ≥ 8% RWA,  Contagion) 
 90 95 96 97 98 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.995 99.999
BE           -             -              -              -              -              -              -        69,445     75,203     88,009     94,148   110,907 
BG           -             -              -              -              -              -              -              56          144          451          830       1,817  
DK           -             -              -              -              -                1            57     12,190     18,116     59,049     66,486     85,445 
DE           -             11           25            54         128         436      1,255   321,017   388,965   464,719   494,974   575,736 
GR           -             -              -              -              -              -            158      3,499       5,720      14,362     19,065     29,247 
ES           -             -              -              -                2         146      1,348     14,860     30,581     79,267   105,814   164,196 
FR           -             -              -              24         181      1,585      5,955     39,357     92,949   223,088   261,608   346,929 
IE           -             -              -              -              -              -            787     68,848     77,334     91,954     97,964   113,956 
IT           -             16           34            76         186         592      1,438      6,889      11,013     30,447     41,798     74,748 
CY           -             -              -              -              -              -              -        19,573     21,463     23,632     24,464     26,382 
LV           -             -              -              -              -              -                2          110          201          847       1,371       2,597  
LU           -             -              -              -              -              -              -        50,776     60,553     74,228     77,739     85,326 
MT           -             -              -              -              -              -              -              52          182          800       1,101       2,904  
NL           -             -              -              -              -              -                5      24,275   129,948   157,113   168,784   198,370 
AT           -             -              -                3           19           99         414      8,767      14,296     36,686     44,584     60,661 
PT           -             -              -              -              -              -              67      6,924      12,988     23,435     27,773     37,992 
FI           -             -              -              -              -              -              -            380      24,983     31,519     34,826     43,503 
SE           -             -              -              -              -              -              -              69       9,780      58,346     65,067     79,655 
UK           -             -              -              -                0           46         323   185,759   292,365   353,069   382,369   449,315 
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Table (5): Estimated distributions of systemic excess losses in Scenario 2 - Million Euro (Capital ≥ 8% RWA, No Contagion) 
 90 95 96 97 98 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.995 99.999
BE           -             -              -              -              -              -              -         3,626       6,813      15,926     20,747     34,157 
BG           -            -              -              -              -              -              -              38            79          225          309          545  
DK           -             -              -              -              -                1            49      1,698       3,464      10,191     14,051     26,281 
DE           -             11           24            53         125         405      1,074      5,716      10,620     34,282     49,025     98,660 
GR           -             -              -              -              -              -            106      1,897       3,217       6,995       8,948      14,842 
ES           -             -              -              -                2         117         902      7,424      11,999     28,101     37,829     60,990 
FR           -             -              -              23         166      1,182      4,251     19,393     30,235     63,643     83,061   132,007 
IE           -             -              -              -              -              -            337      4,291       6,764      13,939     17,927     28,407 
IT           -             16           34            74         180         560      1,340      5,854       9,313      22,234     31,288     51,638 
CY           -             -              -              -              -              -              -            111          339       1,284       1,797       3,142  
LV           -             -              -              -              -              -                1            60          107          253          327          556  
LU           -             -              -              -              -              -              -            618       1,505       4,505       6,040       9,796  
MT           -             -              -              -              -              -              -              16          118          455          636       1,129  
NL           -             -              -              -              -              -                5       2,304       7,237      25,386     34,589     58,693 
AT           -             -              -                3           18           86         279      2,134       3,603       7,639       9,533      15,123 
PT           -             -              -              -              -              -              51      2,684       4,642       9,858      12,512     19,359 
FI           -             -              -              -              -              -              -            144       1,809       8,125      11,336     19,874 
SE           -             -              -              -              -              -              -              66       1,965       9,983      14,103     25,154 
UK           -             -              -              -                0           43         269      8,136      18,270     53,579     72,394   128,850 
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Table (6): Estimated distributions of systemic excess losses in Scenario 3- Million Euro (Capital ≥ 10.5% RWA, Contagion) 
 90 95 96 97 98 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.995 99.999
BE           -             -             -              -              -              -              -        15,509     63,852     79,753     86,050   102,517 
BG           -             -             -              -              -              -              -              55          143          449          808       1,813  
DK           -             -             -              -              -              -              17      1,525      12,677     53,523     61,735     80,107 
DE           -               6           16            38           95         318         917     12,370   370,337   455,300   484,531   565,109 
GR           -             -             -              -              -              -              -         1,382       2,940       8,065      11,175     20,790 
ES           -             -             -              -                0           65         471     10,507     24,720     65,275     85,791   141,078 
FR           -             -             -                1           45         330      1,373     14,891     28,204     95,974   157,523   260,554 
IE           -             -             -              -              -              -              -         8,699      46,159     77,618     84,660   101,801 
IT           -             -               2            11           40         204         636      4,056       7,281      22,128     33,045     56,190 
CY           -             -             -              -              -              -              -        19,359     21,371     23,585     24,427     26,320 
LV           -             -             -              -              -              -              -              52          128          597          968       2,279  
LU           -             -             -              -              -              -              -            757      52,376     71,921     75,799     83,630 
MT           -             -             -              -              -              -              -                5          147          760       1,051       2,827  
NL           -             -             -              -              -              -              -         9,773      72,722   151,571   163,275   192,763 
AT           -             -             -              -                9           60         211      2,322       4,555      17,751     31,780     53,248 
PT           -             -             -              -              -              -              -         2,143       5,351      14,086     18,440     28,193 
FI           -             -             -              -              -              -              -                4       1,058      29,373     32,648     41,363 
SE           -             -             -              -              -              -              -              45       8,710      53,712     62,356     77,536 
UK           -             -             -              -              -                9           96     38,574   166,950   306,174   337,066   401,732 
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Table (7): Estimated distributions of systemic excess losses in Scenario 4 - Million Euro (Capital ≥ 10.5% RWA, No Contagion) 
 90 95 96 97 98 99 99.5 99.9 99.95 99.99 99.995 99.999
BE           -             -             -              -              -              -              -         1,001       4,076      12,938     17,701     30,398 
BG           -             -             -              -              -              -              -              37            78          223          306          543  
DK           -             -             -              -              -              -              16         981       2,470       9,083      12,975     24,947 
DE           -               6           16            38           93         301         809      4,885       9,623      33,852     47,704   100,895 
GR           -             -             -              -              -              -              -            767       1,776       5,184       7,069      11,801 
ES           -             -             -              -                0           56         383      5,057       9,368      25,575     34,404     57,558 
FR           -             -             -                1           44         307      1,148     10,230     18,085     45,269     60,498     99,316 
IE           -             -             -              -              -              -              -         2,016       4,120      10,610     14,284     24,026 
IT           -             -               2            11           40         196         597      3,514       6,251      17,605     25,427     43,833 
CY           -             -             -              -              -              -              -            107          330       1,274       1,794       3,116  
LV           -             -             -              -              -              -              -              30            66          199          272          496  
LU           -             -             -              -              -              -              -            308          751       3,006       4,453       8,105  
MT           -             -             -              -              -              -              -                3            88          432          610       1,112  
NL           -             -             -              -              -              -              -         1,642       5,586      22,034     30,741     54,775 
AT           -             -             -              -                9           55         172      1,288       2,383       5,954       7,825      13,101 
PT           -             -             -              -              -              -              -            638       2,133       6,912       9,297      15,739 
FI           -             -             -              -              -              -              -                3          433       5,988       9,166      17,731 
SE           -             -             -              -              -              -              -              44          893       8,735      12,617     23,363 
UK           -             -             -              -              -                8           89      2,330       7,835      37,386     54,891   105,561 
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5.2 Results for individual contributions to systemic losses 
Tables 8-11 show some selected percentiles of the distribution of individual percentage 
contributions to systemic losses. They illustrate individual contributions for the whole 
set of cases (i.e. without considering cases where losses exceed or are below the amount 
of funds available to DGS/RF). Figures should be read as in the following example. For 
Scenario 1 in Belgium the yearly expected loss is lower than 0.9134% for 75% of the 
banks in the sample. Average yearly individual contributions are usually much higher 
than the median, suggesting that there are few banks contributing most to the systemic 
risk.  
This is a not surprising results as bigger banks (less numerous) tend to relatively 
contribute more to higher systemic losses, while smaller banks (more numerous) tend 
to relatively contribute lower systemic losses. 
Table (8): Distributions of individual banks’ percentage contributions – whole – Scenario 1 (Capital ≥ 
8% RWA, Contagion) 
 Selected percentiles 
 10 25 50 75 90 95 99 average 
BE 0.002% 0.004% 0.028% 0.913% 17.114% 26.165% 37.960% 4.348%
BG 0.088% 0.301% 1.632% 4.737% 9.147% 16.741% 26.803% 4.167%
DK 0.000% 0.001% 0.005% 0.027% 0.182% 3.045% 26.629% 1.010%
DE 0.000% 0.001% 0.003% 0.008% 0.026% 0.058% 0.599% 0.068%
GR 0.142% 0.364% 0.890% 7.138% 17.358% 23.152% 35.977% 6.250%
ES 0.002% 0.005% 0.031% 0.164% 1.181% 2.924% 10.899% 0.699%
FR 0.003% 0.007% 0.028% 0.076% 0.576% 2.373% 9.518% 0.513%
IE 0.001% 0.016% 0.308% 3.534% 8.187% 17.686% 37.861% 4.167%
IT 0.002% 0.007% 0.026% 0.092% 0.349% 0.631% 3.974% 0.211%
CY 0.008% 0.208% 0.677% 8.559% 12.251% 23.464% 40.798% 6.667%
LV 0.226% 0.830% 2.715% 7.783% 8.321% 8.740% 23.851% 4.762%
LU 0.033% 0.154% 0.512% 1.360% 3.874% 5.862% 20.351% 1.786%
MT 0.038% 0.332% 1.017% 10.744% 34.341% 41.674% 47.540% 10.000%
NL 0.017% 0.048% 0.087% 0.210% 23.006% 33.675% 37.494% 4.762%
AT 0.011% 0.025% 0.053% 0.137% 0.645% 2.592% 6.262% 0.578%
PT 0.071% 0.198% 0.875% 2.514% 29.067% 36.573% 39.515% 7.143%
FI 0.002% 0.010% 0.225% 1.718% 22.116% 56.991% 84.891% 11.111%
SE 0.001% 0.002% 0.005% 0.018% 0.041% 0.550% 33.224% 1.515%
UK 0.001% 0.003% 0.017% 0.085% 1.124% 1.689% 31.696% 1.177%
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Table (9): Distributions of individual banks’ percentage contributions – whole – Scenario 2 (Capital ≥ 
8% RWA, No Contagion) 
 Selected percentiles 
 10 25 50 75 90 95 99 average 
BE 0.008% 0.021% 0.043% 0.166% 23.184% 32.645% 35.847% 4.348%
BG 0.131% 0.501% 2.734% 4.650% 10.449% 16.067% 18.769% 4.167%
DK 0.000% 0.003% 0.018% 0.077% 0.548% 6.285% 31.063% 2.000%
DE 0.001% 0.003% 0.011% 0.031% 0.071% 0.135% 0.988% 0.068%
GR 0.220% 0.466% 1.579% 7.014% 20.000% 22.997% 28.445% 6.250%
ES 0.001% 0.004% 0.035% 0.172% 0.673% 4.323% 12.865% 0.699%
FR 0.005% 0.009% 0.049% 0.116% 0.431% 2.943% 11.152% 0.513%
IE 0.001% 0.011% 0.063% 3.745% 17.668% 20.717% 22.478% 4.167%
IT 0.002% 0.008% 0.029% 0.103% 0.385% 0.683% 3.018% 0.211%
CY 0.229% 0.647% 1.562% 6.651% 20.914% 28.957% 33.957% 6.667%
LV 0.004% 0.558% 1.162% 4.521% 9.904% 18.763% 33.093% 4.762%
LU 0.024% 0.051% 0.185% 0.679% 2.339% 3.914% 81.659% 3.509%
MT 0.029% 0.047% 0.370% 3.515% 43.160% 47.023% 50.114% 10.000%
NL 0.096% 0.139% 0.212% 0.993% 18.788% 19.327% 44.608% 4.762%
AT 0.029% 0.062% 0.110% 0.260% 0.846% 1.698% 8.996% 0.578%
PT 0.072% 0.170% 0.680% 3.892% 29.531% 31.945% 32.939% 7.143%
FI 0.010% 0.041% 0.238% 1.170% 21.719% 58.092% 87.190% 11.111%
SE 0.004% 0.007% 0.016% 0.040% 0.109% 0.202% 36.629% 1.515%
UK 0.003% 0.008% 0.029% 0.155% 1.108% 5.754% 18.616% 1.177%
Table (10): Distributions of individual banks’ percentage contributions – whole – Scenario 3 (Capital 
≥ 10.5% RWA, Contagion) 
 Selected percentiles 
 10 25 50 75 90 95 99 average 
BE 0.005% 0.010% 0.041% 0.942% 13.634% 29.188% 38.789% 4.348%
BG 0.089% 0.306% 1.571% 4.779% 8.808% 16.832% 27.039% 4.167%
DK 0.000% 0.002% 0.007% 0.034% 0.224% 2.494% 35.705% 1.010%
DE 0.000% 0.001% 0.003% 0.008% 0.026% 0.057% 0.591% 0.068%
GR 0.255% 0.522% 0.867% 8.410% 20.655% 27.048% 27.090% 6.250%
ES 0.002% 0.006% 0.039% 0.213% 1.263% 3.261% 11.691% 0.699%
FR 0.006% 0.013% 0.061% 0.159% 0.574% 2.086% 10.608% 0.513%
IE 0.003% 0.021% 0.355% 3.761% 8.019% 19.072% 36.437% 4.167%
IT 0.002% 0.009% 0.022% 0.082% 0.369% 0.686% 4.399% 0.211%
CY 0.008% 0.196% 0.593% 8.579% 12.325% 23.575% 40.906% 6.667%
LV 0.246% 0.995% 3.331% 6.822% 12.498% 12.857% 15.706% 4.762%
LU 0.045% 0.163% 0.556% 1.468% 3.937% 6.282% 19.045% 1.786%
MT 0.047% 0.371% 1.152% 12.214% 38.087% 39.816% 41.199% 10.000%
NL 0.021% 0.052% 0.087% 0.207% 19.462% 35.147% 39.320% 4.762%
AT 0.021% 0.043% 0.096% 0.217% 1.075% 3.078% 10.269% 0.578%
PT 0.084% 0.119% 0.887% 2.793% 27.985% 35.289% 39.041% 7.143%
FI 0.003% 0.018% 0.381% 1.705% 22.438% 56.716% 84.138% 11.111%
SE 0.001% 0.002% 0.006% 0.022% 0.047% 0.571% 33.389% 1.515%
UK 0.001% 0.004% 0.020% 0.083% 1.388% 2.109% 30.037% 1.177%
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Table (11): Distributions of individual banks’ percentage contributions – whole – Scenario 4 (Capital 
≥ 10.5% RWA, No Contagion) 
 Selected percentiles 
 10 25 50 75 90 95 99 average 
BE 0.014% 0.038% 0.077% 0.298% 21.963% 28.825% 38.473% 4.348%
BG 0.133% 0.480% 2.657% 4.708% 10.611% 15.466% 18.847% 4.167%
DK 0.001% 0.004% 0.025% 0.096% 0.653% 5.496% 20.681% 1.010%
DE 0.001% 0.004% 0.012% 0.033% 0.077% 0.135% 0.689% 0.068%
GR 0.374% 0.699% 1.295% 9.460% 17.537% 21.832% 27.339% 6.250%
ES 0.001% 0.006% 0.049% 0.253% 1.011% 3.686% 12.897% 0.699%
FR 0.008% 0.018% 0.095% 0.215% 0.508% 2.573% 8.555% 0.513%
IE 0.001% 0.023% 0.132% 5.040% 16.762% 17.201% 23.586% 4.167%
IT 0.003% 0.010% 0.026% 0.089% 0.378% 0.743% 3.521% 0.211%
CY 0.249% 0.607% 1.031% 6.788% 20.986% 29.266% 35.300% 6.667%
LV 0.006% 0.722% 1.696% 6.593% 14.880% 15.714% 20.751% 4.762%
LU 0.041% 0.086% 0.314% 1.140% 3.497% 4.871% 25.737% 1.786%
MT 0.036% 0.057% 0.438% 4.128% 43.342% 46.326% 48.714% 10.000%
NL 0.118% 0.172% 0.258% 1.005% 22.946% 23.706% 37.104% 4.762%
AT 0.032% 0.076% 0.149% 0.340% 0.901% 2.303% 10.630% 0.578%
PT 0.090% 0.185% 0.643% 5.452% 27.921% 30.767% 32.690% 7.143%
FI 0.017% 0.072% 0.404% 2.017% 22.950% 56.717% 83.730% 11.111%
SE 0.005% 0.009% 0.020% 0.052% 0.141% 0.261% 36.910% 1.515%
UK 0.003% 0.010% 0.036% 0.227% 1.681% 4.490% 19.557% 1.177%
 
5.3 The FAT 
To calculate the profit part of the Financial Transaction Tax, we would ideally have a 
Cash-Flow financial statement. This is not available to us. Nevertheless, we can use the 
information contained in the unconsolidated financial statements of banks as available 
in ORBIS.11 The profit part of the FAT base is computed as a R+F (i.e. Real + Financial 
transactions) base by adapting accounting profit to cash-flow profit.12 The labour costs 
part is the costs of personnel. As for the IMF's computation, the FAT1 is the sum of these 
two parts, the FAT2 takes the same cash-flow profit definition and 12% of labour costs13 
                                                        
11 Orbis is a database on financial statements of companies published by Bureau Van Dijk. Note that 
the sample can be biased towards large banks as financial information could be harder to obtain 
for smaller banks. Our version of Orbis contains 7,343 banks and 3,609 insurance companies for 
the EU27 (not of all with exploitable financial information). For many banks, several variables 
necessary to compute FAT revenues are missing. In this case, they are estimated in the following 
way: for companies for which consolidated statements are available in Orbis, the missing variable 
of interest is replaced by the one from the consolidated statements, adjusted by the ratio of total 
assets between unconsolidated and consolidated statements. If the information is still missing, 
the same procedure is applied using country- level information on banking structures from the 
ECB publication "EU Banking Sector Stability" of September 2010. 
12 This is done by starting with the profit and loss before tax and distribution, subtracting the 
dividends received from subsidiaries (i.e. applying an exemption to avoid double-taxation), 
adding the change in (non- equity) liabilities, subtracting the change in assets, except for change 
in cash hold and investment in subsidiaries. 
13 This is estimated to be 40% of the wage differential in the UK between the top 25 percent of earners in 
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and the FAT3 limits the cash-flow profit to what excesses 15% of total equity and adds it 
to 12% of the labour costs. It is important to note that the first two methods allow a loss-
relief between the profit and the labour parts of the base, while the last method 
essentially put a ceiling of zero on the profit part. Hence, the base of a risk-taxing FAT 
could in theory be larger than the base for the other two methods. In all cases, an 
illustrative rate of 5% is applied to the base for 2009. 
Table 2 provides the coefficient of correlations between the three types of FAT and the 
four scenarios of systemic risk. Several messages stand out. First, when contagion is not 
avoided, all versions of FAT perform in about the same way. Second, when contagion can 
be avoided, FAT1 is more aligned to risk and provides the best incentive. This is not 
completely surprising as capital requirement require more equity when banks take 
more risks. If more risky activities produce high profits, part of them might be needed to 
remunerate the higher capital required. It shall be stressed that FAT3 rests on the 
hypothesis that high returns are due to higher risks. While this could be true, other 
factors may trigger higher returns such as a lack of competition or more efficient 
production methods (e.g. superior knowledge of markets, a more productive workforce, 
mean management structures). In this latter case, the tax could be a tax on talent rather 
than a tax on high risk. In practice, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) find that the 
contribution of an individual institution to systemic risk is correlated with leverage, the 
relative size and maturity mismatch. As indicated in Table 2, FAT1 is the option that is 
best correlated with size, as measured by total assets. Finally, increasing capital 
requirement from 8% to 10.5% unambiguously increases the correlation between the 
contribution to FAT and the contribution to systemic risk. This reveals the fact that 
higher capital requirements are able to contain the part of the risks that are not 
necessarily linked to the size of the institution (e.g. leverage), increasingly leaving the 
remaining risk to be linked to size only. 
 
Table 2: Correlation between individual contributions to FAT and Systemic Risk 
Scenarios FAT1 FAT2 FAT3 
Scenario 1: Contagion - 8% 0.492 0.457 0.441 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the financial sector and the top 25 percent earners in the rest of the economy. The 40% is based on the 
study by Philippon and Reshed (2009) for the US who find that between 30% and 40% of the wage 
differential is rent. See Keen et al (2010), page 138. Note that Egger et al. (2012) found evidence of a 
wage premium in the financial sector which amounts to about 43% in the OECD. 
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Scenario 2: No Contagion - 8% 0.516 0.328 0.265 
Scenario 3: Contagion – 10.5% 0.561 0.533 0.515 
Scenario 4: No Contagion – 10.5% 0.570 0.387 0.327 
Total assets 0.708 0.541 0.443 
Note: taking FAT revenues adjusted for relocation and elasticities effects provide very similar results. All 
correlations are significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the potential contributions of banks, in 
particular large ones on systemic risks. Several regulatory measures – among which a 
strengthening of capital requirements and of funding of Deposit Guarantee Schemes - 
are currently being considered to minimise this risk and its consequences for both 
public finances and economic growth, in particular given the possibility of contagion of 
failing banks to other financial institutions.  
At the same time, several options on how to increase the contribution of the financial 
sector to the cost of the crisis have been at the political agenda. One of the possible 
desired features of such a tax could be its ability to curb risk and/or to be in relation 
with the risk posed by individual institutions to the whole financial system. The 
Financial Activities Tax (FAT), in its various versions, as been recently discussed by the 
IMF and the European Commission.  
This paper uses the SYMBOL model to estimate the contribution of each bank to 
systemic losses under alternative scenarios of capital requirements and (absence of) 
contagion. In parallel, we compute FAT liabilities for individual banks under three 
designs of the tax and look at correlations between those liabilities and individual 
contributions to systemic risk. The broader version of the FAT (FAT1) is found to be the 
one that would be best correlated with individual risk, especially when there is no 
contagion. This is mainly due to the fact that FAT1 is the design that is best correlated 
with the size of the institution which appears to be a major determinant of its impact on 
aggregate risk, the more so the higher the level of capital requirements. 
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 ANNEX A: Description of the sample of banks for the SYMBOL simulations 
Table A.1: Description of the samples used for the simulations, data as of end 200914. 
 
Number G1 
Banks 
Number G2  
Banks 
Sample % 
Population15 
Total Assets 
(m€) 
Total 
Liabilities 
(m€) 
Total 
Interbank 
Debt16  
(m€) 
Total 
Interbank 
Credit17  
(m€) 
Total Covered 
Deposits (+) 
(m€) 
Total  
Capital 
Requirements 
(8% RWA) 
(m€) 
Total Capital 
(m€) 
DGS/RF 
funds18 (+) 
(m€) 
BE 3 20 82.26% 878,336 829,934 184,888 160,678 260,890 23,413 48,401 2,516 
BG(*) 0 24 94.77% 34,383 29,614 6,521 6,521 14,074 2,239 4,769 223 
DK 3 96 71.05%  756,678  708,878 143,362 92,279  118,179  23,749 47,800 2,168 
DE 6 1476 64.19% 4,648,331 4,415,620 1,086,016 790,975 1,093,841 125,452 232,711 20,096 
GR 3 13 71.42% 322,714 295,667 43,441 20,313 135,758 16,781 27,047 1,511 
ES 8 135 73.95% 2,370,807 2,188,636 348,780 226,113 542,332 115,565 182,171 7,874 
FR 17 178 102.59% 7,191,608 6,817,107 842,666 779,727 1,550,504 245,024 374,500 22,850 
IE(*) 5 19 101.91% 1,221,181 1,155,789 276,738 148,729 147,145 44,121 65,392 3,488 
IT 8 465 81.81% 2,827,051 2,556,174 188,375 195,958 476,963 97,416 270,876 7,816 
CY (*) 0 15 80.80% 107,446 100,436 53,067 53,067 22,661 4,883 7,011 537 
LV(*) 0 21 72.65% 19,088 17,037 5,943 2,609 3,995 1,127 2,050 58 
LU 1 55 68.35% 465,539 441,916 169,984 161,827 103,441 11,485 23,622 1,321 
MT 0 10 43.83% 18,076 16,225 5,222 2,689 6,893 760 1,851 58 
NL 4 17 78.02% 1,680,455 1,600,687 319,699 398,659 314,059 46,903 79,768 5,091 
AT 1 172 29.88% 306,457 282,380 50,382 39,692 71,381 14,656 24,077 860 
PT 3 11 66.49% 323,762 297,421 43,561 34,505 82,952 17,704 26,342 1,121 
FI 1 8 78.36% 290,500 275,621 54,361 79,820 48,998 7,968 14,879 1,024 
SE 3 63 52.37% 455,355 422,301  97,604  122,872 75,383  16,356 33,054 1,314 
UK 7 78 73.97% 4,278,074 4,074,946 743,978  691,049 464,241 110,757 203,129 12,313 
Notes: (*) Source is Central Bank or Supervisory Authority; (+) Estimated. 
                                                        
14 Year 2009 is the latest year available in Bankscope and, even more importantly, 2009 is the year on which the Basel and the CEBS committee have based their 
Quantitative Impact Study exercises for the foreseen change on banks' capital and RWA when moving from Basel II to Basel III. 
15 The sample of banks covered in each Member States represents the indicated percentage of total assets for any Member State as shown for 2009 in the 2010 ECB EU banking 
structures publication, computed as the amount of total assets for all banks minus total assets of branches from abroad. European Central Bank (2010), EU banking structures,  
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/eubankingstructures201009en.pdf 
16 A correction factor for the volume of the interbank debt/credit has been applied to the following MS, to correct for the inclusion of some classes of debts certificates: GR (56.5%), 
FR (39.1%), IT (26.9%), LU (79.8%), and AT (48.4%). The correction factors employed have been estimated using the 2010 ECB Banking Sector Stability, Table 11a. 
17 Data on interbank credits was not available for BG and CY so equality of interbank debits and credits has been assumed. 
18 The amount of funds for DGS/RF purposes is rescaled on the size of the sample (column 3 in Table A.1). 
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